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ON DETAINING 300,000 PEOPLE: THE LIBERTY PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS 
 




The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 will introduce a new framework––the Liberty 
Protection Safeguards (LPS)––for authorising arrangements giving rise to a deprivation of 
liberty to enable the care and treatment of people who lack capacity to consent to them in 
England and Wales. The LPS will replace the heavily criticised Mental Capacity Act 2005 
deprivation of liberty safeguards (MCA DoLS).  The new scheme must provide detention 
safeguards on an unprecedented scale and across a much more diverse range of settings 
than traditional detention frameworks linked to mental disability. Accordingly, the LPS are 
highly flexible, and grant detaining authorities considerable discretion in how they perform 
this safeguarding function. This review outlines the background to the 2019 amendments 
to the MCA, and contrasts the LPS with the DoLS. It argues that although the DoLS were 
in need of reform, the new scheme also fails to deliver adequate detention safeguards, and 
fails to engage with the pivotal question: what are these safeguards for? 
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The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 was supposed to be a ‘really small, 
uncontroversial’ Bill,1 one the whips could safely steer through a febrile parliamentary 
session engulfed by Brexit-related chaos.  Its object and purpose was to replace the current 
administrative framework for authorising deprivation of liberty in care homes and hospitals 
– the Mental Capacity Act 2005 deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS) – which were 
universally agreed to be broken and in need of reform. As it happened, the whips were 
wrong; the Bill was widely criticised and the government was defeated three times in the 
Lords.  However, the Bill received Royal Assent in May 2019 and is planned to commence 
in October 2020.2   
 
The 2019 amendments to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) replaced the DoLS with  a 
successor scheme: the Liberty Protection Safeguards (LPS).3 The LPS are intended to 
deliver safeguards compliant with article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
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data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2019-
0635/letter_from_Caroline_Dinenage_Liberty_Protection_Safeguards.pdf (unless otherwise stated, all URLs 
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(ECHR),4 the right to liberty and security of the person, for people who are deprived of 
their liberty in connection with arrangements to enable their care and treatment.  
 
It is envisaged that the LPS will authorise an estimated 304,132 detentions annually in 
England and Wales.5 To put this into perspective: in 2018-19 there were just under 50,000 
new detentions to provide inpatient treatment for mental disorder under the MCA’s sister 
statute (the Mental Health Act 1983 MHA),6 the prison population in England and Wales 
stood at just over 82,000,7 and over 26,000 people passed through immigration detention.8  
The new LPS will represent a high-water mark in the history of detention in the UK (Figure 
1, below).  
 
These are not ‘paradigmatic’ cases of deprivation of liberty.9  The affected population is 
predominantly older adults with dementia and people with intellectual disabilities, autism 
or brain injuries.10 A minority, less than 2%, will be receiving inpatient treatment for mental 
disorder in psychiatric hospitals.11 Some will be treated for physical conditions in general 
or acute hospitals. The largest affected group will be in residential care or nursing homes.12 
More perplexingly, the LPS will also apply to tens of thousands of adults living in private 
homes, including ‘supported living’ accommodation and, in what is likely to be a source of 
growing social and political anxiety, some adults living with their families.13 
 
Internationally, there is growing concern about the ‘re-institutionalisation’ of disabled 
adults in community settings,14 with some states and international bodies beginning to 
     
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe) 213 UNTS 
222, ETS No 5, UN Reg No I-2889; [Opened for Signature] 4th Nov 1950, [Entered into Force] 3rd Sep 1953]. 
5 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Impact Assessment: Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill (Revised IA, 
dated 31/01/2019): at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-
2019/0323/MCAB%20Impact%20Assessment%20FINAL.rtf%20SIGNED.pdf 
6 NHS Digital, ‘Mental Health Act Statistics’ Annual Figures 2018-19: at https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-
information/publications/statistical/mental-health-act-statistics-annual-figures/2018-19-annual-figures 
7 Ministry of Justice, HM Prison Service and Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, ‘Official Statistics, 
Prison population figures 2018’ (2019): at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/prison-population-
figures-2018 
8  Home Office, ‘Immigration statistics, year ending March 2018’ : at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-march-2018 
9 S.W. Stark, ‘Deprivations of liberty: beyond the paradigm’ (2019) (April) Public law  [380-401].  
10 NHS Digital, ‘Supplementary information: DoLS activity by disability group during reporting period 2017-
18’ (2019): at https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/find-data-and-publications/supplementary-
information/2019-supplementary-information-files/dols-activity-by-disability-group-during-reporting-period-
2017-18. 
11 In 2017-18, 5,260 DoLS applications in England were from ‘mental health establishments’ out of a total of 
240,455 (2%).  However, the LPS will apply to a larger population because it incorporates new settings and 
age groups. NHS Digital, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005, Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards England, 2018-19’ 
(2019) at: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-capacity-act-2005-
deprivation-of-liberty-safeguards-assessments/england-2018-19. Equivalent data are not given for Wales: 
Care Inspectorate Wales and Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, ‘Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Annual 
Monitoring Report for Health and Social Care 2017-18’ (2019), at: https://careinspectorate.wales/deprivation-
liberty-safeguards-annual-monitoring-report-health-and-social-care-2017-18. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Response to request for information from the Law Commission under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000, 10 May 2019, available upon request from author. 
14 N. Crowther, ‘The right to live independently and to be included in the community in European States: 
ANED synthesis report’ (European Network of Academic Experts in the Field of Disability (ANED), 2019)  at: 
https://www.disability-europe.net/theme/independent-living. 




view this through the lens of detention.15 The LPS will be of interest to states contemplating 
regulatory responses to non-paradigmatic detentions. Whether they will improve upon the 
DoLS––which were regarded internationally as a cautionary tale16–– remains to be seen. 
 
The application of the detention paradigm to settings that have until very recently 
represented freedom in the community raises searching questions about how, and why, 
we have come to invoke this right in these contexts. These pressing questions are beyond 
the scope of this review; which considers the operational challenges of securing article 5 
compliant safeguards on this scale. I outline the background to the DoLS and the LPS, 
before examining their provisions in greater detail and charting the key issues and debates 




The MCA 2005 is an unlikely vehicle for the detention of over 300,000 people.  Unlike the 
MHA it is not generally viewed as a ‘compulsory power’, 17  and is often described 
domestically as ‘empowering’.18 It provides a framework for making substitute decisions in 
the ‘best interests’ of a person considered to lack the ‘mental capacity’ to make a particular 
decision. Whereas the MHA includes a ‘public protection’ remit, the focus of the MCA is on 
the protection of the individual.  
 
The MCA potentially applies to almost all decisions in a person’s life; from what they eat 
for breakfast, to where they live, their relationships with others, and decisions about 
medical treatments.  It is central to almost all aspects of the care and treatment of 
populations whose capacity may be in doubt. 
 
A key characteristic of the MCA is its ‘informality’. Even very serious medical and personal 
welfare decisions can potentially be made without the involvement of courts or formally 
appointed decision makers.  Instead, caregivers can rely upon a ‘general defence’ against 
     
15 W. Boente, ‘Some Continental European Perspectives on Safeguards in the Case of Deprivation of Liberty 
in Health and Social Care Settings’ (2017) (23) International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law [69-
83]; Fritze, Chesterman, Grano, ‘Designing a deprivation of liberty authorisation and regulation framework: 
Discussion paper’ (Office of the Public Advocate, Victoria 2017);  Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
‘Guardianship final report background paper: Legislative schemes regulating deprivation of liberty in 
residential care settings’ (2012); Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, ‘Restrictive Practices 
in Residential Aged Care in Australia’ (Background Paper 4, 2019) at: 
https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/; UNHRC ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities C Devandas Aguilar’ UN Doc A/HRC/40/54, (11 January 2019) ; See also recent complaints 
brought to the CRPD Committee - DR v Australia (communication 14/2003) CRPD/C/17/D/14/2013), (19 May 
2017); and also jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, e.g. Stanev v Bulgaria (2012) 55 
E.H.R.R. 22; [2012] M.H.L.R. 23. DD v Lithuania [2012] M.H.L.R. 209. 
16 (Ibid) Victorian Law Reform Commission; (Ibid) Victoria Office of the Public Advocate, Fritze, Chesterman 
and Grano;  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Adults with Incapacity (Scot Law Com No 240, 2014); C 
McKay and J Stavert, ‘Scotland's Mental Health and Capacity Law: The Case for Reform’ Edinburgh Napier 
University (2017) at: http://www.napier.ac.uk/about-us/news/mentalwelfarecommission; Department of 
Health (Ireland - An Roinn Sláinte), ‘Deprivation of Liberty: Safeguard Proposals: Consultation Paper’ (2017) 
at: https://health.gov.ie/consultations/ 
17 E.g. Wessely et al, ‘Modernising the Mental Health Act’ (Final report of the Independent Review of the 
Mental Health Act 1983) December 2018 [123]. 
18 E.g. Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (2007) [foreword by The 
Rt Hon. the Lord Falconer of Thoroton]. 




liability19, which codified the common law position that acts of care or treatment in the best 
interests of those lacking the capacity to consent can rely upon the doctrine of necessity.20 
This was viewed by the Law Commission in the 1990s as avoiding the stigma and 
‘bureaucracy’ associated with mental health law, ‘normalising’ the care and treatment of 
people deemed to lack capacity.21 However, the defence has been described as operating 
in practice as a broad de facto power22 whilst providing few of the procedural safeguards 
commonly associated with compulsory powers.  
 
The MCA contains a scheme of Independent Mental Capacity Advocacy (IMCAs)23 and 
potential recourse to the Court of Protection, a superior court of record, in cases of doubt 
or dispute.24  However, legal challenges to decisions made under the MCA are rare.25 
 
A. The Bournewood Case 
 
The government did not initially associate the MCA with detention when developing the 
Bill.26 This changed in October 2004, at the Bill’s second reading, when the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in HL v UK 27 that an autistic man who was ‘informally’ 
admitted to Bournewood Hospital, apparently in his best interests and on grounds of 
necessity, had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty.  
 
HL had been living in the community with his carers but had been taken to Bournewood 
Hospital following agitated behaviour at his day centre. For historical reasons, the MHA is 
primarily used to formally detain patients who are regarded as ‘objecting’ to admission or 
treatment; it is rarely used for those who are regarded as compliant with admission and 
treatment.28  HL was sedated, and although his behaviour indicated that he was very 
distressed29  he was not regarded by clinicians as ‘objecting’ or attempting to leave.  
Without the provisions of the MHA, there was no obvious mechanism for his carers or 
relatives to seek to discharge him or challenge his informal admission.  A claim was brought 
on HL’s behalf seeking judicial review of the decision to ‘detain’ HL and a writ of habeas 
corpus to secure his discharge. The domestic courts approached the question of whether 
HL had been detained through the lens of the tort of false imprisonment, with the House 
of Lords concluding that he was not falsely imprisoned because he had not actually 
     
19 MCA ss 5, 6. 
20 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1; [1989] 2 WLR 1025. 
21 Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview (Law Com No 119, 
1991). 
22 A. Ruck Keene, ‘Powers, defences and the ‘need’ for judicial sanction’ (2016) (Autumn) Elder Law Journal 
[244-52]. 
23 MCA s35-41. 
24 MCA ss 15, 16.  
25 L. Series, P. Fennell and J. Doughty, ‘Welfare cases in the Court of Protection: A statistical overview’ Cardiff 
University, Report for the Nuffield Foundation (2017), at: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/118054. 
26 Lord Chancellor's Office, Who decides? Making decisions on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults, Cm 
2803 (1997); Lord Chancellor's Office, "Making Decisions" The Government's proposals for making decisions 
on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults, Cm 4465 (1999); Department for Constitutional Affairs, Draft 
Mental Incapacity Bill, Cm 5859 (2003). 
27 [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 32; [2004] M.H.L.R 236 277. 
28 Recommendations of Lord Percy, Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness 
and Mental Deficiency. 1954-1957, Cmnd 169 (1957). 
29 HL v UK n 27, at [39]; Health Service Ombudsman, ‘Annual Report for 2001-2: Case No.  E. 2280/98-99’ 
(2001). 




attempted to leave. Even if he had been so detained, they held that the hospital had a 
defence against liability under the common law doctrine of necessity.30 
 
HL’s family and carers successfully pursued the case to the ECtHR, which rejected the 
distinction relied upon by the House of Lords between ‘actual restraint’ and ‘restraint which 
was conditional upon his seeking to leave’.31 HL ‘was under continuous supervision and 
control and was not free to leave’, and was thus deprived of his liberty.32  Noting the dearth 
of regulation and safeguards for informal admissions, the Strasbourg Court found a 
violation of the article 5(1) ECHR requirement for a ‘procedure required by law’ and no 
effective means to challenge the detention before an appropriately constituted authority 
(namely a court/tribunal etc) as is required by article 5(4). HL’s detention, and that of 
thousands like him, was therefore unlawful under the Convention. 
 
B. The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
 
The government consulted on what to do about the estimated 100,000 adults in care 
homes and hospitals who fell within the so called ‘Bournewood gap’ following the ruling in 
HL v UK.33  The majority of respondents opposed the use of the MHA for the affected 
population, which was primarily older adults with dementia and people with intellectual 
disabilities or autism, mainly on grounds of its perceived stigma.  Thus, a parallel 
framework for authorising detention in care homes and hospitals––the DoLS––was inserted 
into the MCA in 2007.34 
 
The DoLS will be compared with the LPS in more detail below. In outline, ‘managing 
authorities’ of hospitals and care homes must recognise that patients or residents are 
deprived of their liberty and must apply to ‘supervisory bodies’ for authorisation. These are 
mainly local authorities; although in Wales, Local Health Boards (LHBs) function as 
supervisory bodies for hospital detentions.  Supervisory bodies must send out a Best 
Interests Assessor (BIA) and a Mental Health Assessor (MHAr) to assess whether six 
‘qualifying requirements’ for detention under the DoLS are met.  If all are met, the 
supervisory body must authorise the detention. Additional safeguards available to the 
‘relevant person’ include the appointment of a ’Relevant Person’s Representative’ (RPR), 
usually from amongst their family and friends, potentially an IMCA (as well as or instead 
of an RPR), reviews by the supervisory body and the right to seek a judicial review of the 
authorisation from the Court of Protection under s21A MCA. 
 
     
30 R. v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust Ex p. L [1999] 1 A.C. 458; [1998] 3 W.L.R. 
107. 
31 HL v UK n27, at [90]. 
32 HL v UK n27, at [91]. 
33  Department of Health, ‘Bournewood’ Consultation’ (2005); Department of Health, ‘Protecting the 
Vulnerable: the “Bournewood” Consultation: Summary of Responses’ (2006). 
34  MCA Scheds A1 and 1A, inserted via the Mental Health Act 2007. 




The DoLS are regarded as ‘very much the poor relation of the MHA’:35  notorious for their 
complexity,36 with administrative costs double that of the impact assessment37 and eye-
wateringly expensive litigation.38  Yet they did not provide an effective means to challenge 
detention when the detained person, or those close to them, objected. 
 
The widely reported case of Steven Neary illustrates the difficulties.39 Neary is an autistic 
man with intellectual disabilities who had been living with his father, with support funded 
by the London Borough of Hillingdon.  Following a temporary stay in respite care, Hillingdon 
moved Neary into a ‘positive behaviour unit’ (a registered care home) against his wishes 
and those of this father.  A litany of failures followed, including: an initial failure to even 
seek a DoLS authorisation, a long delay in appointing an IMCA to support Steven and his 
father (who was RPR), and a failure to seriously consider Steven’s own wishes and feelings 
in assessments. It was almost a year before the case reached the Court of Protection, in 
part because the council misled the family that it was planning to return Steven home, and 
in part because Steven’s father was scared that if he ‘rocked the boat’ the council might 
review Steven’s entitlements to support if he returned home.40 The Court of Protection 
discharged the authorisation, meaning Steven could return home, and found violations of 
both article 5 and rights to respect for home, family and private life under article 8 ECHR. 
 
Neary established the principle that disagreements over ‘significant welfare issues’ that 
cannot be resolved by other means should be urgently placed before the Court of 
Protection.41  There is a positive obligation on the state to ensure that a person is ‘not only 
entitled but enabled to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed speedily by a court’ 
(emphasis added).42  Following Neary, other local authorities have been criticised for using 
the DoLS to remove people from their homes and families, sometimes restricting contact 
with loved ones, without ensuring these disputes are speedily brought to court.43 Overall, 
the rate of appeal under the DoLS is around one per cent,44 whereas the number of people 
     
35 R. Jones, ‘Deprivations of Liberty: Mental Health Act or Mental Capacity Act?’ (2007) (16) Journal of Mental 
Health Law 170-74, [170]. See also: P. Bowen, Blackstone's Guide to The Mental Health Act 2007 (Oxford: 
OUP 2007); R. Hargreaves, ‘The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards - essential protection or bureaucratic 
monster?’ (2009) (19) Journal of Mental Health Law 117-27; M. Gunn, ‘Hospital treatment for incapacitated 
adults’, (2009) (17) (2) Medical Law Review, 274-81. 
36 C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council [2011] EWHC 3321 (Fam), at [24]; [2012] M.H.L.R. 202. House 
of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Report of Session 2013–14 (Mental Capacity Act 
2005: post-legislative scrutiny) (HL 139), at [271]. 
37 A. Shah and others, ‘Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in England: implementation costs’, (2011) (199) (3) 
British Journal of Psychiatry, [232-38]. 
38 L Series, P Fennell and J Doughty, n25. 
39 London Borough of Hillingdon v Neary [2011] EWHC 1377 (COP) [2011] 4 All E.R. 584; [2011] M.H.L.R.  
404  
40 Ibid, at [146]. 
41 Ibid, at [33]. 
42 Ibid, at [202]. 
43 Somerset v MK (Deprivation of Liberty: Best Interests Decisions: Conduct of a Local Authority) [2014] 
EWCOP B25; Essex County Council v RF (Deprivation of Liberty and damage) [2015] EWCOP 1; Milton Keynes 
Council v RR [2014] EWCOP B19; SR v A Local Authority [2018] EWCOP 36; Local Government Ombudsman, 
‘The Right to Decide: Towards a greater understanding of mental capacity and deprivation of liberty’ (2017) 
[1], at: http://collateral2.vuelio.co.uk/RemoteStorage/LGO/Releases/1176/DOLS%20AND%20MCA%20-
%20EMB.pdf. 
44 This is the rate of appeals per standard authorisation; the rate of appeals against emergency authorisations 
would be far lower. 




who are said to be objecting to their confinement is estimated to be around 30 per cent.45  
There is a strong likelihood that when the person, or those close to them, objects to 
detention under the DoLS, they are not reliably able to exercise Article 5(4) ECHR rights of 
challenge. 
 
In 2013-14 the House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA conducted post-legislative 
scrutiny of the 2005 Act.46 Whilst finding that the MCA continues to be held in ‘high regard’, 
the Committee concluded the DoLS were ‘poorly drafted, overly complex’ and ‘far from 
being used to protect individuals and their rights, they are sometimes used to oppress 
individuals’.47 It called upon the government to ‘start again’.48 
 
C. Cheshire West 
 
The DoLS authorise ‘deprivation of liberty’49, defining this by direct reference to article 5 
ECHR.50 When the DoLS were inserted into the MCA, the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR) and others had called for a statutory definition, but the government had refused 
on the basis that it was ‘not possible’ to supply one.51 Managing authorities and supervisory 
bodies adopted their own working definitions of ‘deprivation of liberty’, resulting in low and 
highly variable application rates.  By 2014, it was believed that thousands of adults were 
unlawfully detained.52 
 
It is not necessary to define deprivation of liberty in order to authorise it (the MHA does 
not). An alternative approach would be to define a list of triggering circumstances when 
the safeguards must apply. This was at one point suggested by the Law Commission in 
their proposals to reform the DoLS (below).53 This approach requires engagement with the 
elusive question posed by Peter Bartlett: what are the DoLS actually for?, beyond the 
circular answer of providing deprivation of liberty safeguards.54  The meaning of article 5 
is a technical lawyers’ question, ultimately determined by the courts. Asking where 
safeguards would be necessary, beneficial or potentially counterproductive is a 
fundamentally more democratic question, requiring stakeholder consultation and 
parliamentary debate.55 
 
     
45 Department of Health and Social Care, Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact Assessment (2018) 1. 
46 Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny, n36. 
47 Ibid, 7. 
48 Ibid. 
49 MCA Sched A1, s 1-3. 
50 MCA s64(5), as amended. 
51 JCHR Fourth Report of Session 2006-07 (Legislative Scrutiny: Mental Health Bill) (HC 288, HL 40) at [84] 
and Appendix 3 [52] for government’s response. 
52  HL 139 (2014) n36, [7]; Care Quality Commission, ‘Monitoring the use of the Mental Capacity Act 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in 2012/13’ (2014) at http://www.cqc.org.uk/public/news/protecting-
people%E2%80%99s-human-rights-when-they-cannot-consent-treatment. 
53 Law Commission, Mental capacity and deprivation of liberty: A consultation paper (Consultation Paper 222, 
2015) Provisional proposals 7-2 – 7-4. 
54 P. Bartlett, ‘Reforming the deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS): What is it that we want?’ (2014) 20 
(3) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, http://webjcli.org/article/view/355. 








The result of leaving the scope of the DoLS to the courts was, inevitably, near-continuous 
litigation on this issue. By 2014 a series of confusing, sometimes contradictory and 
controversial rulings had defined deprivation of liberty so narrowly that even a man who 
had broken down the door of a care home attempting to escape,56 and a woman wanting 
to leave a care home to return to her own home,57 were found not to be deprived of their 
liberty.  Thus, the Supreme Court ruling in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council and 
another; P and Q v Surrey County Council 58 on the meaning of ‘deprivation of liberty’ in 
connection with care arrangements for people considered unable to consent to their care 
arrangements was keenly awaited. 
 
The Cheshire West case concerned three people with intellectual disabilities living, 
variously, in a ‘small NHS facility’, a shared apartment with support, and with a foster 
parent.  Being neither hospitals nor registered adult care homes, these were outside the 
limited scope of the DoLS, meaning authorisation would require costly annual court 
applications.59 Delivering the leading judgment, Lady Hale relied upon what she took to be 
the ratio in HL v UK and later cases before the ECtHR,60 holding that the ‘acid test’ of 
deprivation of liberty is whether a person is subject to continuous supervision and control 
and not free to leave.61 That they are not objecting, that the arrangements are the least 
restrictive possible and in their best interests, or ‘normal’ for a person with a similar 
condition, is irrelevant to the question of whether they are deprived of their liberty (but 
relevant to whether it is justified).  
 
Whether Cheshire West is a landmark human rights victory or a perverse interpretation of 
article 5 ECHR is hotly debated.62 It’s practical consequences, however, are undeniably 
challenging.  Within a year of the 2014 judgment, the volume of DoLS applications 
increased by more than a factor of ten and continued to rise, as depicted in Figure 1. In 
2018-19 supervisory bodies in England received 240,455 DoLS applications and they had 
acquired a backlog of over 131,350 unprocessed applications. 63  The Association of 
     
56 C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council, n36. 
57 CC v KK and STCC  [2012] EWHC 2136 (COP) at [99] [2012] C.O.P.L.R. 627. 
58  [2014] UKSC 19; [2014] A.C. 896. 
59 Salford City Council v BJ (Incapacitated Adult) [2009] EWHC 3310 (Fam); [2010] M.H.L.R. 283. 
60 Stanev v Bulgaria; D.D. v Lithuania, n15; Kędzior v Poland [2013] M.H.L.R. 115; BAILII 2012 ECHR 1809; 
Mihailovs v Latvia [2014] M.H.L.R. 87; BAILII 2013 ECHR 65. 
61 Cheshire West, n 58, at [48]-[49]. 
62 E.g. I. Burgess, ‘We should welcome this Supreme Court ruling- it enshrines social work values in law’ 
Community Care (London, 12 September 2014); Care Quality Commission, Monitoring the use of the Mental 
Capacity Act Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in 2013-14 (2015); D. Whitaker, ‘Social justice for safeguarded 
adults deprived of their liberty in the United Kingdom?’ (2014) (29) (9) Disability & Society  1491-95; N Allen, 
‘The (not so) great confinement’ (2015) (March) Elder Law Journal , 45-52; J. Holbrook, ‘A distorted view’  
(2014) 164 (7605) New Law Journal[7-9] ; Hewson B, ‘How UK judges forgot the meaning of ‘liberty’’ (Spiked 
2014) http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/how-uk-judges-forgot-the-meaning-of-
liberty/14840#.UzlH4vldU41. 
63 NHS Digital (2019); Care Inspectorate Wales and Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (2018), n 11. 




Directors of Adult Social Services produced a ‘priority tool’64 to help supervisory bodies 
work out––in the words of the JCHR––‘how best to break the law’.65 
 
 
Figure 1 Estimated and actual annual detentions under the MHA, the DoLS and the LPS66 
 
Following Cheshire West an estimated 53,000 people outside the scope of the DoLS scheme 
will require safeguards.67 This acid test encompasses people in supported living schemes, 
as well as people in private homes, receiving publicly or privately arranged care, or even 
care delivered by families themselves, known as ‘domestic DoLS’.68  The judgment also 
means that thousands of 16 and 17 year olds and other children in the care of the State 
would require detention safeguards. 69   The Law Commission estimated that if these 
     
64 Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, ‘A Screening tool to prioritise the allocation of requests to 
authorise a deprivation of liberty’ (2016) https://www.adass.org.uk/adass-priority-tool-for-deprivation-of-
liberty-requests/. 
65 JCHR, Seventh Report of Session 2017–19 (The Right to Freedom and Safety: Reform of the Deprivation 
of Liberty Safeguards) (HC 890, HL 161) (2018) [3]. See also: Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Investigation 
into a complaint against Staffordshire County Council (reference number: 18 004 809)’ (2019). 
66  It is not possible to give the actual detention rate for DoLS because so many applications remain 
unprocessed, hence the application rate is given here. Data sources: DoLS statistics from annual reports 
available on NHS Digital, at: https://digital.nhs.uk; statistics on the Lunacy and Mental Treatment and Mental 
Deficiency Acts from appendices of Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness 
and Mental Deficiency, n 28; data from impact assessments for the Bournewood consultations (n 33) and 
the Mental Capacity Amendment Bill (n 5); MHA detentions data from NHS Digital (n 6). 
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populations were given safeguards compliant with article 5 ECHR (which they were not),70 
the overall cost of the existing scheme would exceed £2bn a year.71 The father of Steven 
Neary subsequently told the JCHR that the Council that had unlawfully detained him now 
sought authorisation for alleged deprivation of liberty in his own home.72 
 
An analysis of Cheshire West is beyond the scope of this article,73 but it was the key 
precipitating factor for the extraordinary increase in detentions under the MCA and the 
operational challenges facing both DoLS and the LPS.  Its underpinning policy rationale, 
spelled out by Lady Hale, was that if the appellants were not found to be ‘deprived of their 
liberty’––then––‘no independent check is made’ on whether their care arrangements are in 
their best interests.74 The ‘extreme vulnerability’ of the affected population means we 
should ‘err on the side of caution’ when deciding what constitutes a deprivation of liberty.75   
 
It might plausibly be argued that Cheshire West was a legal response to the minimal 
procedural safeguards available under the MCA and wider concerns about the provision of 
adult social care. 
 
D. The Law Commission 
 
The government asked the Law Commission to review the DoLS. They concluded the DoLS 
were indeed broken and in need of reform: too complex, too inflexible, their scope too 
limited, with a lack of oversight and effective safeguards.76 The DoLS were too narrowly 
focussed on article 5––‘a technical legal solution to a technical legal problem’77––when the 
key substantive issues were better captured by article 8 ECHR––rights to enjoyment of 
home, family and private life.  
 
The Commission’s initial proposals for two tiers of safeguards, promoting a wider range of 
rights, were scaled back to a framework for authorising deprivation of liberty––the LPS––
and modest amendments to the MCA. 78  To align the MCA more closely to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),79 the Commission proposed 
     
(Fam); A Local Authority v D [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam); Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1695; Re D (A 
Child) [2019] UKSC 42. 
70 A McNicoll, ‘Councils’ failure to make court applications leaving ‘widespread unlawful deprivations of liberty’ 
a year after Cheshire West ruling’ Community Care (London, 17 June 2015) at: 
https://www.communitycare.co.uk/2015/06/17/councils-failure-make-court-applications-leaving-
widespread-unlawful-deprivations-liberty-year-cheshire-west-ruling/. 
71 Law Commission, Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty (Law Com No 372, 2017). 
72 JCHR, The Right to Freedom and Safety: Reform of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, n 65. 
73 I discuss the judgment in L Series, ‘Making sense of Cheshire West’ in Claire Spivakovsky, Linda Steele and 
Penelope Weller (Eds) The Legacies of Institutionalisation: Disability, Law and Policy in the 
‘Deinstitutionalised’ Community (Hart forthcoming 09-07-2020). 
74 Cheshire West, n 58, at [1], see also [32]. 
75 Ibid, at [57]. 
76 Law Commission (2015) n 53. 
77 Ibid, at [2.15], citing P. Bartlett n 54. 
78 Law Com (2017), n 71. 
79 Analysis of article 12 CRPD is beyond the scope of this paper, but see: P. Bartlett, ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law’ (2012) 75 (5) Modern Law 
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placing ‘particular weight’ on the wishes and feelings of the person in best interests 
decisions, 80  and a statutory framework for supported decision making. 81   As an 
intermediate safeguard, they recommended that the general defence should only be 
available for very serious decisions if certain information were recorded.82  They also 
proposed a new tort of unlawful deprivation of liberty, 83  and provisions for ‘advance 
consent’ to a potential deprivation of liberty.84  Subsequently the JCHR largely endorsed 
the Law Commission’s approach.85 
 
E. The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill 
 
In July 2018 the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill86 was tabled in the House of Lords. 
There had been no further public consultation, yet the Bill differed from the Law 
Commission’s proposals in important respects.87 The government estimated the ‘adjusted’ 
LPS scheme in the Bill would save over £200m per year,88 whilst improving and extending 
existing safeguards and fixing an overwhelmed system. Even the Minister responsible––
Lord O’Shaughnessy––commented that this sounded almost ‘too good to be true’.89 
 
To the dismay of organisations representing disabled people, the scope of the Bill was 
narrowly focused on article 5 ECHR, without the amendments to bring the MCA closer to 
the CRPD.90 Gone too was the tort of unlawful deprivation of liberty, provisions for advance 
consent and requirements for a written record for serious decisions. The government’s Bill 
was considerably shorter than the Law Commission’s, with many clauses and provisions 
omitted.91 The government insisted that key operational details could be included in the 
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80 Law Com No 372, n 71, recommendation 40. 
81 Ibid, recommendation 42. 
82 Ibid, recommendation 41. 
83 Ibid, recommendation 45. 
84 Ibid, recommendation 43. 
85 JCHR, The Right to Freedom and Safety, n 65. 
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http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/files/DEP2018-
0796/Annex_A__Law_Commission_Recommendation_and_govt._action.pdf . 
88 Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill (Revised IA, dated 31/01/2019, 2019) n 5. 
89 Hansard, HL Series 5, (2nd Reading) Vol 792 col 1106 (16 July 2018). 
90 See written evidence of People First and Inclusion London to the Public Bill Committee (MCAB46) (n 86), 
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Code of Practice, despite recent confirmation that the MCA’s codes cannot create legal 
obligations that are not already established via other sources of law.92 
 
The Bill was heavily criticised by stakeholders, including: professional bodies, 93  local 
government,94  care providers,95 civil rights organisations,96 and organisations representing 
older and disabled people.97 Almost 200,000 people signed a petition calling for better 
protection of the rights of disabled people.98 Peers declared the Bill ‘one of the worst pieces 
of legislation ever brought before this House’.99 
     
92 An NHS Trust & Ors v Y & Anor [2018] UKSC 46; [2019] A.C. 978, at [97]. 
93 British Association of Social Workers, ‘BASW England response to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill’ 
(October 2018) at https://www.basw.co.uk/media/news/2018/oct/basw-england-response-mental-capacity-
amendment-bill; Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, ‘The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill – 
ADASS Statement – 4th September 2018’, at: https://www.adass.org.uk/adass-responds-to-mental-capacity-
amendment-bill; Law Society, ‘Parliamentary briefing: Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill – House of Lords 
committee stage’ (2018) at https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/public-affairs/parliamentary-
briefing/parliamentary-briefing-mental-capacity-amendment-bill-hol-committee-stage/.  See evidence 
submitted to the Public Bill Committee (n 86) by the British Medical Association, Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
Royal College of Nursing, and the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists. 
94 Local Government Association, ‘Briefing: The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill Committee stage, House 
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January 2019), at: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/news/blog/protect-vulnerable-people-
government-must-fix-mental-capacity-amendment-bill. 
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august-18.pdf; Inclusion London,  ‘Inclusion London’s Briefing on the Mental Capacity Amendment Bill’ 
(September 2018), at: https://www.inclusionlondon.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Briefing-on-the-
Mental-Capacity-Amendment-Bill-for-DDPOs.pdf; ‘Mental Capacity Act (Amendment) Bill Briefing from Third 
sector Second Reading [Commons]’, signed by Mencap, National Autistic Society, Mind, Rethink Mental 
Illness, Alzheimer’s Society, VoiceAbility, Disability Rights UK, POhWER, Parkinson’s UK, BIHR, Sense, Liberty, 
Learning Disability England, the Disabled Children’s Partnership and the Challenging Behaviour Foundation, 
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2R-debate-18.12.2018-1.pdf. See also the evidence submitted by the Relatives and Residents Association, 
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The Bill proceeded in haste. Parliamentarians complained of excessively short sitting times 
and insufficient time to consider government amendments.100 It progressed in parallel to 
an independent review of the MHA,101 meaning many key matters about the relationship 
of detention under the MCA to mental health law were debated before the review had 
made its final recommendations.102  Accessible materials on the Bill for disabled people 
were produced too late in the Parliamentary process for any significant contributions to 
amendments or debate.103 Key decisions––for example, over whether to include a statutory 
definition of deprivation of liberty––were made so late the Bill entered ‘Ping Pong’104. 
Considerable energy was expended fighting major problems, such as the ‘care home 
arrangements’, whilst issues that emerged later around advocacy, renewals, and ‘domestic’ 
deprivation of liberty received limited attention.  The government maintained there was an 
urgent need for action following Cheshire West.105 But the frantic pace of the Bill could also 
be explained by fears that it would be overtaken by wider political events connected with 
Brexit.106 
 
III. THE (ADJUSTED) LIBERTY PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS 
 
The main distinguishing characteristic of the LPS from the DoLS is their flexibility in where 
and how they operate.  Greater flexibility is necessary to cope with the scale and diversity 
of deprivation of liberty following Cheshire West, yet this inevitably inserts complexity, 
discretion and the potential dilution of safeguards. 
 
A. From ‘Accommodation’ to ‘Arrangements’ 
 
The DoLS construct deprivation of liberty as a function of being ‘accommodated’ in a care 
home or hospital.107 The LPS deal instead with ‘arrangements’ to ‘enable’ care or treatment 
that ‘give rise to’ a deprivation of liberty.108 The authorisation of ‘arrangements’ is more 
fluid, applying to potentially any setting, multiple settings, and transfers between settings. 
The Commission hoped this would give responsible bodies greater control over ‘the ways 
in which a person may justifiably be deprived of liberty’, 109  instead of approaching 
     
100 E.g. Hansard, HL 5 Series Vol 794 col 593 (27 November 2018); Hansard, HC 6 Series Vol 651 col 731 – 
and col 754 (18 December 2018); Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee (1st Sitting) col 10  (15 January 2019); 
Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee (6th Sitting) col 186 (22 January 2019); Hansard, HC Series 6 (Report 
Stage) Vol 654col 847 (12 February 2019). 
101 ‘Modernising the Mental Health Act’, n17. 
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reading in the House of Lords. 
103 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: easy read’ (published 31 
January 2019) at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mental-capacity-amendment-bill-easy-
read; Department of Health and Social Care, Equality Analysis: Liberty Protection Safeguards – Mental 
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detention as a binary question.110  For example, authorising arrangements involving one 
set of restrictions, but not others.111  
 
The drafters of the LPS envisioned a ‘bright line’ distinction between the arrangements to 
enable care and treatment that give rise to a deprivation of liberty, and the underlying care 
and treatment decisions themselves. The LPS can only authorise the former, whilst care 
and treatment decisions would continue to be made informally under the general 
defence112, or by attorneys or deputies. The MHA also distinguishes between authorisation 
of detention and treatment,113 but the need for assessment or treatment is still built into 
the admission and review criteria.114  It is unclear how far assessments, reviews and legal 
challenges under the LPS must take underlying care and treatment decisions as an 
indisputable starting point for the arrangements, with the only question left for the LPS to 
resolve whether the person should be deprived of their liberty to achieve these, or whether 
care and treatment decisions can themselves be scrutinised within the LPS processes. It 
may not always be conceptually or practically straightforward to distinguish care and 
treatment decisions from the arrangements to enable these. This issue will be revisited 
below.   
 
B. The Authorisation Process 
 
Article 5(1) requires deprivation of liberty to be in accordance with ‘fair and proper 
procedures’ executed ‘by an appropriate authority’. 115   The DoLS procedure required 
managing authorities of care homes and hospitals to apply to supervisory bodies for 
authorisation of a deprivation of liberty. This often led to a ‘carousel’,116 where public 
bodies commissioned care or treatment then required managing authorities to seek 
authorisation from them for it.  The LPS seek to ‘streamline’ assessments into existing care 
and treatment planning processes. 117  Local authorities, NHS hospitals, clinical 
commissioning groups (CCGs) and LHBs serve as ‘responsible bodies’ where they provide 
or commission the care themselves.118 They may authorise the arrangements provided they 
are satisfied that the LPS apply,119 the authorisation conditions are met, and they comply 
with the procedural requirements described below.120 
 
Some administrative burdens will therefore be redistributed from local authorities to other 
NHS bodies.  However, local authorities will still receive the highest proportion of 
applications; both because they commission the greatest number of care placements and 
     
110 Ibid, [9.7]. 
111 This may potentially operate in a similar way as the power of the supervisory body to set conditions on a 
DoLS authorisation: MCA Sch A1 s 53. 
112  Law Com 372 (n71) at [10.14]. See also: Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Mental Capacity 
(Amendment) Act 2019: Explanatory Notes’ (2019) at [35], 
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because the hierarchical approach adopted121 leaves them with responsibilities for privately 
arranged care, care provided informally by friends or family, and––owing to concerns about 
financial conflicts of interest––independent hospitals.  
 
C. Care Home Arrangements 
 
The largest proportion of DoLS and LPS applications concern people living in residential 
care. 122   The government’s ‘adjusted’ 123  LPS model introduced a new and separate 
procedure for authorising arrangements in residential care settings: the ‘care home 
arrangements’.124  The care home arrangements flow from the desire to ‘streamline’ the 
LPS into existing care planning processes, and relieve pressure on local authorities.  
 
The government’s initial idea was that care home managers could take on some functions 
otherwise performed by the responsible body, albeit with local authorities as responsible 
bodies still holding overall responsibility for issuing the authorisation.  Care home managers 
were to arrange all LPS assessments themselves and make certain critical decisions around 
representation and advocacy. The responsible body would conduct a pre-authorisation 
review based on a statement by the care home manager.125  Yet, the government assured 
care providers it would be the responsible body who would be liable if things went wrong.126 
 
The care home arrangements were not consulted upon by the government.  Professional 
bodies, local government bodies and care providers themselves expressed concerns about 
financial conflicts of interest, the competence and ability of care homes to conduct the 
relevant assessments, and the impact of these additional responsibilities on an already 
struggling sector. 127  No additional resources were allocated for this assessment and 
administration role.128 There were concerns that care homes might pass these costs on to 
residents.129 
 
The government initially argued that LPS assessments by the responsible body would 
‘duplicate’ those already being undertaken by care homes.130  Yet more than half of all care 
home placements are at least partially funded and arranged by local authorities or the 
NHS 131 , ergo reintroducing the ‘carousel’ the Commission had sought to remove.  
Furthermore, the assessments undertaken for the LPS are distinct from those undertaken 
by care homes for operational purposes.  Simply put, the LPS are concerned with examining 
the proposed arrangements in comparison with potential alternative options; including 
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122 71 per cent of all DoLS applications in 2017-18 were from care homes (residential or nursing).  NHS Digital 
(n 11). 
123 The Government described the scheme contained in the 2018 Bill as the “Adjusted Liberty Protection 
Safeguards’” – Department of Health and Social Care, Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact Assessment 
(2018) 1. 
124 MCA Sch AA1 s17(i), defined s3. 
125 See initial version of the Bill, dated July 2018 (n86). 
126 ‘Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact Assessment’ (2018), (n 123) at [8.9]. 
127 See n 90, n 93, n 94, n 95. 
128 ‘Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact Assessment’ (2018), (n 123) at [8.6], [12.16]. 
129 Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee (1st Sitting) col 67 (15 January 2019) (Alex Cunningham MP); Hansard, 
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those in other settings than the care home.  This is integral to the ‘least restriction’ principle 
contained in the MCA, DoLS and LPS, and is also a necessary ingredient of capacity 
assessments.132 Conversely, it is unlikely that the care home’s own internal assessments–
–under the MCA––would  explore alternative arrangements other than those that the care 
home could put in place. It is not the role of the care home manager to investigate other 
possible places where the person could receive care and support. 
 
The care home arrangements were fiercely criticised in the Lords. The government 
responded by giving the responsible body discretion over whether they or the care home 
hold the reins in arranging the assessments.133 Where the care home does, regulations will 
prohibit anybody with a ‘prescribed connection’ to the care home from conducting the key 
assessments. This is to protect against conflicts of interest.134 Care homes will therefore 
be forbidden from relying upon their own internal assessments and will be required to 
source these from other professionals; yet it is unclear who will provide these assessments. 
This may be relatively straightforward when local authority and NHS professionals arrange 
care on behalf of these public bodies, however privately arranged care will not necessarily 
involve independent professional assessments under the MCA.  This issue is revisited for 
the different assessments below.  
 
D. Authorisation Conditions and Assessments 
 
The DoLS have six qualifying requirements, assessed by the Best Interests Assessor (BIA) 
or the Mental Health Assessor (MHAr). The government boasted of reducing this to three 
assessments under the LPS:135 medical, mental capacity and ‘necessary and proportionate’.  
In reality, responsible bodies will still need to be assured of similar criteria and make similar 
determination as under the DoLS.136 What has changed is who can determine whether 




Although the MCA applies from age 16 upwards,137 the DoLS only applied to people aged 
over 18.138 However, following Cheshire West 139 potentially thousands of children and 
young people in the care of the state are considered to be deprived of their liberty.140 At 
     
132 A pre-requisite of a capacity assessment, see: CC v KK and STCC [2012] EWHC 2136 (COP). 
133 MCA Sched AA1 s17. 
134 MCA Sched AA s21(5) (for medical and mental capacity assessments) and s22(3) (for the necessary and 
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135 ‘Equality Analysis: Liberty Protection Safeguards – Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill’ (n 103) [6]. 
136 National DoLS Leads Group written evidence to the Public Bill Committee, at: 
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137 MCA s2(5). 
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139 See Cheshire West, n 58, and n 69 for deprivation of liberty cases concerning people aged under 18. 
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consent to arrangements amounting to deprivation of liberty in special schools, residential care or hospitals. 
Response to request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, 10 May 2019, n 13. See also: Children's 
Commissioner, Who are they? Where are they? Children locked up (2019) at: 
https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/publication/who-are-they-where-are-they/. In Re D (A Child) 
(n69) the Supreme Court confirmed that parents cannot consent to a deprivation of liberty on behalf of 
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present, these must be authorised by the courts. The Law Commission recommended that 
the LPS apply to 16- and 17-year olds. 141  The government accepted this 
recommendation, 142  and the LPS will apply from 16 upwards. 143  The care home 
arrangements, however, only apply from 18 upwards.144 
 
F. Mental Disorder 
 
Article 5(1) ECHR permits detention only on certain limited grounds, including 
‘unsoundness of mind’.145 This ground directly conflicts with article 14 CRPD,146 which 
provides that ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.’147 
The Law Commission concluded that the CRPD Committee’s approach required ‘a greater 
process of change over a much longer timescale’,148 prioritising (for now) compliance with 
the ECHR. 
 
Article 5(1)(e) requires ‘objective medical evidence’ of a ‘true mental disorder’ of a ‘kind or 
degree warranting compulsory confinement’.149  The DoLS ‘mental health’ criterion employs 
the definition of ‘mental disorder’ established by the MHA––‘any disorder or disability of 
the mind’150––but with a qualification restricting the MHA’s application to people with 
learning disabilities151 removed.   
 
The Law Commissioners were concerned that this potentially excluded people with ‘pure’ 
brain disorders, such as a stroke.152  It is not obvious why this would not constitute a 
‘disorder or disability of the mind’, but this may reflect a cultural reluctance within 
psychiatry to apply the MHA to these populations. To accommodate these cases, the 
Commission initially proposed use of the MCA’s diagnostic threshold––‘an impairment of, 
or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’153––but later concluded that this 
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146 P. Fennell and U. Khaliq, ‘Conflicting or complementary obligations? The UN Disability Rights Convention, 
the European Convention on Human Rights and English law’ (2011) (6) European Human Rights Law Review 
, 662-74; P. Bartlett, ‘A mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting confinement: examining justifications 
for psychiatric detention’ (2012) 16 (6) International Journal of Human Rights , 831-44. Although see also: 
E. Flynn, ‘Disability, deprivation of liberty and human rights norms: Reconciling European and international 
approaches’ (2016) 22 International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law, 75-101 
http://journals.northumbria.ac.uk/index.php/IJMHMCL/article/view/503/997. Also considered in: Rooman v 
Belgium [2018] M.H.L.R. 250; BAILII 2019 ECHR 105 – and ‘Modernising the Mental Health Act’, n 17, Annex 
B. 
147 See also: Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Guidelines on article 14 of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ GAOR, 72nd session, Suppl no 55 Annex, 2017 (Adopted by the 
CRPD during its 14th session, 17 August-4 September 2015). 
148 Law Com CP 222, n 53, [3.22]. 
149 Winterwerp, n 115, at [39]. 
150 MHA s1(2). 
151 MHA s(2A), as amended by MHA 2007. The term ‘learning disability’, rather than intellectual disability, is 
used in UK legislation and policy. Where referring to specific UK legislation or policy, the phrase ‘learning 
disability’ will accordingly be used. 
152 Law Com CP 222, n 53 [6.8]-[6.9]. 
153 MCA s2(1). 




was too broad. Applying Goldilocks logic, they eventually recommended a test of 
‘unsoundness of mind’ for its fit with article 5(1)(e).154  Predictably this caused widespread 
offence, and the government amended the Bill so that the LPS now employs the same 
‘mental disorder’ test as the DoLS.155 
 
The DoLS require the ‘mental health’ assessment to be conducted by the MHAr, who must 
be a registered medical professional with specialist qualifications and experience. 156 
However the LPS do not replicate this role; there is limited specification of who can 
undertake the ‘medical assessment’ of whether a person has a mental disorder. The Law 
Commission noted ‘encouraging developments’ in Strasbourg suggesting ‘general 
practitioners, psychologists and psychotherapists’ could provide the necessary medical 
evidence 157 , and the government repeated this in parliamentary debates. 158  Medical 
professional bodies were concerned that the 2019 amendments did not require those 
undertaking the ‘medical assessment’ to have medical qualifications.159 The ECtHR has 
more recently indicated that in some circumstances psychiatric expertise is necessary.160 
Statutory ‘requirements’ for those undertaking LPS medical assessments has been deferred 
to regulations.161  Initial impact assessments indicate the government expects GP’s to 
perform LPS medical assessments for free.162 However, there is no mandatory obligation 
on them to do so and charging regulations do not prohibit them from charging patients for 
this.163  
 
G. Mental Capacity 
 
The DoLS require assessment of whether the person has the mental capacity to decide 
‘whether or not he should be accommodated in the relevant hospital or care home for the 
purpose of being given the relevant care or treatment.’ 164  This assessment may be 
conducted either by the BIA or the MHAr. Of the six DoLS qualifying requirements, ‘mental 
capacity’ is the one that is most frequently found not to be met by DoLS assessors.165 
 
Under the LPS, the assessment of mental capacity no longer concerns accommodation but 
‘consent to the arrangements’.166 Here, the tricky distinction between care and treatment 
and detention itself, which also figures under the DoLS, comes into sharp relief.  Do the 
LPS require capacity assessors, reviewers, and the Court of Protection to only consider 
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whether a person can make decisions about the ‘arrangements’ to facilitate care and 
treatment, not the underlying care and treatment decision itself?  For example, should LPS 
capacity assessors simply accept––without question–– underlying assessments that a 
person lacks capacity to consent (or refuse) a specific treatment, or to restrict contact with 
loved ones, or even where to live? If a regime of supervision and control is imposed to 
prevent sexual activity on the basis that a person lacks the capacity to consent to sex,167 
must the LPS capacity assessment start from the premise that this assessment is correct 
and merely consider the arrangements to secure this protection? The Code may offer 
guidance here, but the issue forces a reckoning with the underlying question of what the 
LPS are safeguards against. 
 
Regulations will ‘make provision’ for who can provide a capacity assessment under the 
LPS.168 For care home arrangements, assessments cannot be undertaken by anyone with 
a ‘prescribed connection’ to the care home.169  Care homes will therefore need to source 
capacity assessments from third parties. Where care is publicly funded or arranged, public 
bodies should in theory have undertaken capacity assessments for the care and treatment 
itself. For private self-funders, it is less likely that independent professionals will have 
assessed a person’s capacity to consent to care arrangements, as local authority social 
workers or NHS professionals will be less likely to have arranged or commissioned the care.  
The government appears to believe that GPs will also conduct LPS capacity assessments 
for free,170 yet they play little role in most decisions concerning residential care.  This 
promises to be a major practical sticking point for the LPS unless resolved. 
 
Although regulations specify who can conduct capacity and medical assessments, the 
responsible body or care home manager must ‘determine’ whether these authorisation 
conditions are met.171 The ‘determination’ may be based on a previous LPS assessment, or 
an assessment for another purpose, provided it appears ‘that it is reasonable to rely on the 
assessment’,172 having regard to: the length of time since it was carried out, its purpose, 
and whether there has been a change in the person’s condition.173  
 
IV. FROM ‘BEST INTERESTS’ TO ‘NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE’ 
 
Detention under article 5(1)(e) ECHR must be necessary and proportionate with regard to 
the risk of harm to the person or to others.174 Additionally, and so far as is possible, 
protective measures should reflect ‘the wishes of individuals capable of expressing their 
will’.175 These elements of the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty are dealt with under the 
LPS’s new ‘necessary and proportionate’ test, which replaces the DoLS ‘best interests’ 
assessment. 
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The DoLS’ best interests assessment is regarded by many as the ‘cornerstone’ of the 
authorisation process.176 It must be conducted by the BIA, typically a social worker, who 
must have specialist skills, training and experience177, and be independent of the person’s 
care and treatment.178  The BIA must determine whether it is in the person’s ‘best interests’ 
to be a ‘detained resident’, whether it is necessary for them to be detained ‘in order to 
prevent harm to the relevant person’ and whether this is a proportionate response to the 
likelihood and seriousness of that person suffering harm if they were not detained.179  In 
practice, it is extremely rare for the ‘best interests’ requirement of the DoLS to be found 
not to be met.180 However, it is possible that the process of assessment, and the potential 
for BIA’s to recommend ‘conditions’ for authorisation, may still lead to reduced restrictions 
or substantive changes to care arrangements.  No data are collected on this, however. 
 
BIAs told the Law Commission that the test could be difficult to apply in practice. Unlike 
the MHA, risk of harm to others is not a potential ground for detention under the DoLS. 
However, at the fringes of the DoLS were cases like P v A Local Authority 181, where the 
real reason for the restrictions were less to prevent harm to the person than to others.182  
This included cases (like P’s) of young men with intellectual disabilities who were sexually 
attracted to children, as well as people who sometimes acted aggressively towards other 
residents or loved ones, or people who might otherwise be detained under the MHA. It was 
sometimes argued that it is in a person’s best interests to prevent them from harming 
others, for example if they themselves would have wished to be prevented from hurting 
other people, or to prevent serious consequential risks such as a community backlash, 
imprisonment or detention in hospital under the MHA.183  In P v A Local Authority, the 
authorisation was discharged by the Court of Protection as not being necessary and 
proportionate in relation to the risk to P himself.  Reportedly, P subsequently offended and 
was imprisoned.184  The Commission’s suggestion of including a new ground of risk of harm 
to others within the best interests test185 received a mixed response at consultation: some 
viewed this as avoiding intellectual dishonesty or more restrictive measures, others were 
nervous about the MCA straying into the traditional public protection terrain of the MHA.  
Some asked ‘how far can this be taken before it goes beyond the remit of the Mental 
Capacity Act’?186 
 
The Commission also heard that BIAs found it hard to describe some care arrangements 
as being in the ‘best interests’ of a person, when in reality they were the only available 
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option.187  The best interests test, the Commission concluded, added ‘nothing’ to the 
assessment in the ‘vast majority of cases’,188 but added ‘complications’189 in cases where 
the real concern was harm to others. They reached a radical conclusion: abolish the DoLS 
best interests requirement altogether, and replace it with a new test of whether the 
deprivation of liberty was necessary and proportionate with regard to either the risk of 
harm to the person or to others.190  This test reflected the position under the ECHR191 and 
could accommodate cases like P’s.192 
 
The Commission envisioned the MCA’s best interests principle still playing a role in 
‘formulating the arrangements as a whole’, strengthened by their wider proposed reforms 
to the MCA.193 Yet they – and later the independent review of the MHA – acknowledged 
that the MCA’s ‘best interests’ principle sits uneasily alongside public protection.194  It was 
unclear whether the Commission intended that the LPS would empower responsible bodies 
to authorise arrangements that could potentially be said not to be in the person’s best 
interests, extending powers of detention under the LPS beyond the traditional remit of the 
MCA, and bringing the MCA’s detention framework into conflict with its main statutory 
principles. 
 
The initial version of the government’s Bill did not specify what detention must be 
‘necessary and proportionate’ in relation to, as the MHA review was simultaneously 
considering the matter.195 The government subsequently confirmed the LPS would include 
risk of harm to others,196 but this would only be spelled out in the Code of Practice.197 
However there was no discussion of this issue in in any of the Bill’s supporting materials, 
so it was unclear how the new test would sit alongside the wider provisions of the MCA, or 
how open ended it might be. The Minister appeared to believe (incorrectly) that this 
mirrored the existing position under the DoLS.198 
 
Significant potential dilemmas arise in extending this ground of detention to include risk of 
harm to others.  It would introduce a new public protection ethos within the MCA that is 
alien to its foundational principles. It would create new powers to detain on public 
protection grounds with very weak safeguards, and no consideration has been given to 
whether this might be used for new and unintended populations. It would, paradoxically, 
give public bodies administrative powers of detention on public protection grounds that 
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cannot be exercised by the Court of Protection itself. And there is a risk of highly complex 
interactions with the rest of the MCA when detention could be authorised under the LPS 
but cannot be justified on best interests grounds. The Lords voted to restrict the necessary 
and proportionate test to risk of harm to the person themselves,199 and the government 
did not seek to reverse this. Consequently, ‘risk of harm to others’ is not grounds for 
detention under the LPS.200 Shortly afterwards the MHA review recommended including a 
ground of harm to others to enable the LPS to authorise inpatient detention in some 
circumstances where the MHA currently has to be used.201 This issue may be revisited in a 
future mental health bill.  
 
Those making necessary and proportionate ‘determinations’ must have regard ‘to the 
cared-for person’s wishes and feelings in relation to the arrangements’.202  Although the 
DoLS’ best interests test also required this203, wishes and feelings – and the need for strong 
justification to override these - assume greater visibility in the LPS.  This is arguably one 
benefit of removing the ‘best interests’ test, and may be an incremental step towards the 
emphasis on the ‘will and preferences’ of the person required by the CRPD.204 However the 
presence of LPS criteria linked to disability will continue to remain an obstacle for CRPD 
compliance. 
 
Once again, questions arise over how far consideration of underlying care and treatment 
decisions bleed into determinations of whether the arrangements are necessary and 
proportionate. For example, should those making the determination consider whether 
restrictions on contact with named persons, or finely balanced or contested medical 
treatments, are themselves necessary and proportionate?  The ECtHR has recently clarified 
that article 5(1)(e) imposes an obligation to ensure ‘appropriate and individualised therapy, 
based on the specific features of the compulsory confinement’. The court did not analyse 
the specific content of treatment, but sought to confirm that ‘an individualised programme’ 
was in place.205  LPS assessors will therefore need to make some enquiries into the 
‘therapeutic’ purpose of detention.  Notably, the government also intended the LPS to 
protect article 8 rights,206 implying some consideration of underlying care and treatment 
decisions. 
 
Regulations will specify who may undertake the ‘necessary and proportionate’ 
determination. If the arrangements are ‘care home arrangements’ they may not have a 
‘prescribed connection’ to the care home.207  There is no provision for use of prior or 
equivalent assessments for the necessary and proportionate determination, implying it 
must be carried out afresh for each authorisation.  Unlike the capacity and medical 
assessments, which putatively impose no additional costs, the necessary and proportionate 
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assessment has been costed by the government (at £145.28).208  The expectation is that 
the responsible body will build this determination into care planning, with additional 
resources provided for responsible bodies to undertake the determination for those with 
privately arranged care.209 
 
The DoLS required at least two assessors (BIA and MHAr), one of whom must be 
independent of the person’s care (the BIA), to conduct the relevant assessments. The Law 
Commission had proposed two assessors for the three core LPS assessments.210 The 2019 
amendments do not stipulate this; it is to be hoped that the new LPS Code will impose 




The government asserted, somewhat misleadingly, that the LPS established a ‘new’ and 
stronger duty to consult with the cared-for person and their family211, in order to ascertain 
the ‘wishes or feelings’ of the person.212 The main difference is that the LPS consultation 
duty is explicit and contained within Schedule AA1, whereas the DoLS consultation duty 
was implicit, resting on the MCA’s best interests’ duty to consult others involved in the 
person’s care or interested in their welfare about the person’s wishes and feelings. Unlike 
the LPS, the best interests consultation duty also encompassed the person’s values and 
beliefs,213 and a more demanding duty to ‘permit and encourage’ the person to participate 
in decision making as ‘fully as possible’; these provisions are not replicated in the LPS.214 
The LPS duty initially (inadvertently) excluded the cared-for person themselves from the 
list of persons to be consulted,215 but this was rectified during the passage of the Bill.216   
 
The LPS consultation duty is vital for identifying potential objections, which trigger other 
key safeguards discussed below.  The duty falls on the responsible body or – under the 
care home arrangements – the care home manager. 217   No ‘prescribed connection’ 
regulations apply to consultation, meaning this pivotal role may be undertaken by a person 
with a potential financial conflict of interest. There are risks that people may not feel 
comfortable expressing objections to those directly responsible for their care, or that 
potential signs of objection may missed, dismissed or explained away.  Meanwhile the 
person making the necessary and proportionate determination is under no statutory duty 
to consult the person directly,218 and will therefore rely upon reports of their views by those 
carrying out the consultation. The capacity assessment offers a potential safeguard against 
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distortion or misrepresentation of the person’s views here, provided it properly documents 
any potential objections, since it cannot be undertaken by the care home. 
 
B. ‘No Refusals’? 
 
The MCA enables a person with capacity to nominate their own preferred substitute 
decision maker in a Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA).219 The Court of Protection may also 
appoint a deputy to make specified decisions on the person’s behalf,220 and the person 
may themselves refuse specific medical treatments in advance.221  The DoLS ‘no refusals’ 
requirement prohibited authorisations overriding a valid refusal of care and treatment by 
any attorney, deputy or the person themselves.222  In effect, therefore, the DoLS do not 
empower supervisory bodies to ‘trump’ care and treatment decisions made by the person 
themselves, those they have selected to make decisions for them, or decision makers 
appointed by the court. 
 
The Commission recommended a similar provision for the LPS,223 however it does not 
feature in the 2019 amendments. The government’s rationale was that ‘It is already the 
case that a best interest decision could not be taken which conflicted with a valid decision 
by an attorney/deputy.224 The Bill does not alter this.’225  Yet strictly speaking, there could 
be a valid objection to the arrangements authorised by the LPS but not the underlying care 
and treatment decisions.226  Had the LPS included a ‘risk of harm to others’ ground, this 
too could have circumvented objections insofar as it created scope for detention that is not 
justified on best interests grounds.  Objections by attorneys or deputies and advance 
refusals may be considered under the necessary and proportionate determination, but the 
LPS offer no cast iron guarantee that they will be determinative.   
 
The Law Society observed that the LPS could also be used to trump the objections of 
parents of 16 and 17 year olds without a court order.227  This seems to be confirmed by 
the Law Commission when they observe that parents would have a right to bring 
proceedings in the Court of Protection if they objected.228 
 
There is therefore scope for highly complex litigation about the relative status of an LPS 
authorisation, the limits of parental authority, and other mechanisms for decision making 
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V. INTERFACE WITH THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983 
 
The interface between the DoLS and the MHA is notorious for its complexity.229 It is 
governed by a separate schedule230 and an ‘eligibility assessment’ undertaken by a BIA or 
MHAr with further specialist qualifications.231 In summary: 
 
1 DoLS can authorise detention outside of hospital provided this does not conflict with any 
requirements imposed under a community MHA regime, such as guardianship, supervised community 
treatment or conditional discharge by a tribunal. 
 
2 DoLS may authorise inpatient treatment for a physical disorder. 
 
3 If the detention is to secure inpatient treatment for mental disorder232 and the patient is ‘within 
scope’ of the MHA (that is, an application for detention could be made under s2 or s3 MHA) then 
patient is ineligible for the DoLS if they are objecting.233 
 
4 Patients within scope of the MHA who are not objecting may be detained under either the MHA or 
the DoLS.234 
 
5 Hospital inpatients may not fall ‘within scope’ of the MHA if they have recently been discharged by 
a tribunal235 or have learning disabilities236, in which case they may potentially be eligible for DoLS 
even if they are objecting. 
 
The complexity of the two interlocking regimes can make it difficult for patients themselves 
to understand and exercise their rights, especially if subject to both simultaneously.237 The 
Law Commission heard reports of ‘stand offs’ between professionals arguing over which 
regime should be used.238 
 
The issues at stake in this interface include the stigma and paternalistic culture associated 
with the MHA239 (although it is unclear whether same might also be said of DoLS and LPS) 
and the more rigorous procedural safeguards under the MHA. These include more initial 
assessments, powers of discharge for relatives, automatic referrals to the tribunal, 
safeguards governing treatment without consent and non-means tested aftercare. Their 
criteria for detention also differ: the MHA permits detention of those considered to have 
‘capacity’ and also permits detention on grounds of risk to others, unlike the DoLS (and 
LPS).  
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The Law Commission was troubled by the absence of a ‘clear or meaningful test’ for 
determining which scheme to use.240 One solution – favoured by the Commission and many 
consultees, but beyond its remit - was to ‘fuse’ the MCA and the MHA together, as Northern 
Ireland has.241 Ultimately, the Commissioners were persuaded that retaining parallel legal 
regimes led to significant confusion and uncertainty in practice, and recommended that 
only the MHA should be available for detention on grounds of mental disorder (unless a 
patient had a learning disability).242 
 
Following a 2017 election campaign pledge by Theresa May to address rising rates of 
detention under the MHA,243 an independent review of the Act had been established. Its 
recommendation was at odds with the Law Commission’s: the DoLS/LPS should be retained 
for mental health detention, but discretion to use either regime should be eliminated by 
specifying that only the DoLS/LPS could be used in non-objecting cases.244 This would 
assist with the policy goal of reducing MHA detentions, but the same patients, subject to 
the same treatment and regimes, could instead be detained under the MCA, only with 
weaker procedural safeguards.  
 
The interface rules between the DoLS and MHA are therefore more or less reproduced in 
the LPS at present,245 but may be revisited in the future.  Responsible bodies (and care 
home managers) will therefore still be tasked with navigating this complex interface in 
ensuring the proposed arrangements are not excluded ‘mental health arrangements’ before 
they can be authorised.246  All that has changed is that this is no longer framed as a distinct 
‘assessment’, and there are no statutory requirements for the qualifications or experience 
of those navigating this legal labyrinth. 
 
A. Pre-Authorisation Review 
 
The LPS aim to address the volume problem following Cheshire West by building the core 
assessments into existing care planning processes. It is hoped this ‘streamlining’ will lead 
to earlier and better consideration of the MCA and principles of necessity and 
proportionality during care and treatment decision making, before decisions are 
implemented.247 The cost of this streamlined approach, however, is reduced independent 
scrutiny by assessors who are not involved in care and treatment decisions.  This 
independent safeguard against ‘misjudgments and professional lapses’ was a driving 
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motivation behind both HL v UK 248 and Cheshire West.249  Where the same professionals 
are involved in planning care and treatment and in authorising detention, the ECHR 
requires ‘guarantees of independence’ and counterbalancing procedures.250 
 
Under the LPS this independent element is provided through a pre-authorisation review by 
the responsible body.251 This must be carried out by somebody who is not involved in the 
‘day-to-day care’ of the person or providing any treatment to them, and without any 
‘prescribed connection’ to the care home.252 There is no statutory provision for regulations 
stipulating qualifications or experiences, but some guidance may be provided in the Code.  
The reviewer is personally 253 responsible for determining ‘whether it is reasonable for the 
responsible body to conclude that the authorisation conditions are met’ based on ‘the 
information on which the responsible body relies’.254 The Law Commission anticipated that 
reviewers would not make additional enquiries or commission fresh assessments,255 but 
there is no statutory bar to them doing so. It is debatable how effective a safeguard this 
desktop review will prove to be where the information itself is of dubious quality or 
inaccurate. Some reviewers may adopt a muscular approach, refusing to authorise on the 
basis of visibly poor-quality assessments. Much will depend on the skills and experience of 
the reviewer, and the culture and resources of the institution.  
 
B. Approved Mental Capacity Professionals 
 
The Law Commission recognised that the role of BIAs was particularly important under the 
DoLS. They proposed a revised role as Approved Mental Capacity Professionals (AMCPs), 
central to the authorisation of arrangements amounting to deprivation of liberty. Following 
Cheshire West there are simply not enough BIAs to undertake assessments for all DoLS 
applications (one cause of supervisory body backlogs),256 and the Commission felt it was 
not ‘proportionate or affordable’ for AMCPs to be involved in every case under the LPS.257  
They identified cases where the arrangements were ‘contrary to the person’s wishes’ as 
most in need of oversight.258 Accordingly, wherever ‘there is reason to believe’ the cared-
for person does not wish to reside in a particular place, or to receive care or treatment 
there, the case must be referred by independent reviewers to AMCPs.259   
 
The Commission also recognised that other situations could require oversight, giving as 
examples cases where the person’s wishes were unclear, the restrictions were ‘particularly 
intensive or intrusive’ or where those close to the person were objecting.260 Initially the 
government did not include the Commission’s proposed discretionary power to refer cases 
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to an AMCP in such scenarios, but following objections by stakeholders 261  it was 
reinserted.262 Because of concerns about conflicts of interest for independent hospitals, 
these cases must also be referred to an AMCP.263  The government estimates that  25 per 
cent of all LPS applications will require review by an AMCP.264 
 
AMCPs must ‘review the information on which the responsible body relies’ and ‘determine 
whether the authorisation conditions are met’.265  Before making this determination the 
AMCP must – if it appears to them to be ‘appropriate and practicable to do so’ – meet with 
the cared-for person and consult those listed under the consultation duty. 266  The 
government’s anticipates only a ‘small number’ of cases where it is not appropriate for the 
AMCP to meet with the cared-for person.267  
 
AMCPs have more flexible powers than BIAs. They have an open-ended power to ‘take any 
other action’ that appears to the AMCP to be appropriate and practicable.268 This could 
potentially include undertaking assessments themselves, taking steps to resolve disputes, 
or exploring less restrictive alternatives. The 2019 amendments do not include the Law 
Commission’s recommendation that if AMCPs refuse to authorise arrangements they should 
give written reasons explaining why and describing necessary steps to obtain approval,269 
but nothing prevents AMCPs from doing so. Whereas BIAs could only recommend that 
authorisation be subject to conditions,270 AMCPs potentially have greater control over the 
arrangements since the responsible body may only authorise them if the AMCP agrees the 
LPS conditions are met.271  
 
Despite the potential strengths of AMCPs, weaknesses remain. Roger Hargreaves, a retired 
social worker and DoLS policy lead, notes that the statutory restriction on ‘day to day’ 
involvement in care does not preclude some degree of involvement in underlying 
decisions272, although the Code may go further.  The biggest concern is whether referrals 
to AMCPs will be made where a person’s wishes and feelings are unclear, contested, or 
potential objections are suppressed by medication, institutionalisation or fear of rocking 
the boat.  Those detained for treatment for mental disorder in NHS hospitals are especially 
unlikely to be referred to an AMCP, because if they are regarded as objecting then they 
would generally be ineligible for the LPS. 
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C. The Duration of Authorisations 
 
Article 5(1) requires reviews at ‘reasonable intervals’ to ensure the criteria for detention 
continue to be met.273  The supervisory body may specify a maximum duration of 12 
months for a DoLS authorisation. Once expired, fresh authorisation must be sought, with 
the full complement of assessments and procedures. Consultees told the Law Commission 
this incurred ‘significant costs’ yet amounted to a ‘rubber stamping exercise’ when a 
person’s condition was stable.274  The LPS introduce the option to ‘renew’ or vary an 
authorisation, indefinitely, without necessarily undertaking the full battery of assessments 
and determinations.  
 
D. Renewals, Variations and Reviews 
 
An initial LPS authorisation may last up to twelve months,275 then be renewed for a further 
twelve months and thereafter for periods of up to three years.276 Responsible bodies may 
renew the authorisation if they are satisfied that ‘the authorisation conditions continue to 
be met’, ‘that it is unlikely that there will be any significant change in the cared-for person’s 
condition during the renewal period which would affect whether those conditions are met’, 
and they have carried out a fresh consultation under the consultation duty.277 Provided the 
responsible body is satisfied of the foregoing, they may also choose to renew on the basis 
of a written statement from the care home manager, where the care home carries out the 
consultation.278 
 
The LPS also allow authorisations to be ‘varied’, provided the responsible body is satisfied 
both that a fresh consultation has been carried out by the responsible body or care home 
manager, and ‘that it is reasonable to make the variation’.279  
 
An authorisation ceases to have effect if the responsible body ‘believes or ought reasonably 
to suspect that any of the authorisation conditions are not met’.280  Responsible bodies 
must specify a program of reviews of the authorisation,281 and must additionally review an 
authorisation if it is varied, ‘if a reasonable request is made by a person with an interest in 
the arrangements’, if the cared-for person becomes subject to a regime of the MHA or 
receives inpatient treatment for mental disorder, or where the reviewer becomes aware of 
objections by the cared-for person but the original pre-authorisation review was not by an 
AMCP.282 The review may be carried out by the responsible body, or by the care home 
manager.283  
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There is no statutory requirement for fresh medical or capacity assessments, or ‘necessary 
and proportionate’ determinations for renewals, variations or reviews.  This is potentially a 
matter of serious concern given that authorisation may be renewed indefinitely and 
variations to an authorisation may potentially involve significant changes. The Law 
Commission284 and the government285 anticipated that most reviews would require a fresh 
necessary and proportionate determination, and this may be recommended in the Code. 
Guidance will be needed on the point beyond which it is not ‘reasonable’ to deal with 
changes without a fresh authorisation, with the full battery of assessments and 
determinations. 
 
The LPS renewal process is roughly analogous to the approach taken under the MHA. 
However, the timescales for renewals under the MHA are much shorter (initially after six 
months and thereafter every 12 months), and MHA renewals require a report by the 
responsible clinician to the hospital managers.286 Under the LPS, statutory requirements 
for independence (of reviewers) and regulations concerning qualifications or experience do 
not apply to renewals or reviews unless AMCPs carry them out.  In the MHA context, further 
protection is offered by other available safeguards, not least automatic periodic reviews by 
a tribunal; equivalent safeguards are far weaker under the LPS. The ‘adjusted’ LPS 
therefore provide for indefinite detention with very limited independent oversight. 
 
E. Interim Authorisations and Emergencies 
 
The MCA only protects against liability for deprivation of liberty where a standard or 
urgent287 DoLS authorisation is in place, or where court authorisation is being sought or 
has been granted.288  This creates potential gaps in protection against liability for care and 
treatment providers.  Providers waiting longer than two weeks for a standard authorisation 
(as most currently will) are in theory exposed to liability, and the MCA does not provide for 
deprivation of liberty in emergency situations where it is not feasible to make a DoLS or 
court application.289 
 
The LPS offer interim protection against liability whilst the responsible body is carrying out 
functions under the LPS ‘with a view to determining’ whether to authorise the 
arrangements, or a care home has taken ‘reasonable steps’ to notify the responsible body 
of any such arrangements.290  There is also emergency protection against liability for those 
undertaking ‘vital acts’ to prevent ‘a serious deterioration in P’s condition’, provided there 
is a reasonable belief that the person lacks capacity and it would not be ‘reasonably 
practicable’ to make an application for the person to be detained under the LPS or Part 2 
of the MHA.291 
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The Law Commission recommended against imposing a time limit on interim authorisations 
lest responsible bodies aimed for a maximum time.292 Opposition amendments to limit 
emergency provisions to 14 days were rejected by the government on the same grounds,293 
but guidance will be provided in the Code.294 Of particular concern is the absence of any 
clear commitment to legal aid for challenges pending authorisation.295 
 
F. Rights of Challenge 
 
Article 5(4) rights to a court review of detention are a fundamental safeguard against 
arbitrary detention. Rights of challenge are especially important under article 5 when – as 
under DoLS, LPS and the MHA –detention is initiated without involving the courts.296  Under 
article 5(4) everyone who is deprived of their liberty is entitled ‘to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court’.  This must be 
‘accessible to the person’, and ‘practical and effective’.297 ‘Special procedural safeguards’ 
may be needed to ‘protect the interests’ of those who are ‘not fully capable of acting for 
themselves’.298 
 
States have a margin of appreciation over how this is realised.299 The mechanism employed 
by the MHA is an automatic periodic referral to a tribunal,300 to counteract for what Gostin 
called ‘the burden of coming forward’ in initiating an appeal.301  The Law Commission 
considered this302 but it would have had tremendous resource implications because of the 
scale of detention under LPS.303 
 
Alternatively, states might ‘empower or even require’ someone to act on the person’s 
behalf.304 Both DoLS and the LPS adopt this approach through complex provisions for 
representation and advocacy. However, this approach raises the risk that representatives 
may decline to act on the person’s behalf if they view the detention as in the person’s best 
interests or regard a challenge as futile. The ECtHR has held that rights of appeal must not 
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depend on the goodwill or discretion of third parties305; there must be a clear duty to 
assist.306  
 
A refusal to assist in bringing an appeal cannot be justified by prospects of success307  In 
AJ v A Local Authority 308 the Court of Protection held that ‘there is no place in Article 5(4) 
for a best interests decision about the exercise of that right since that would potentially 
prevent the involvement of the court’.309  If a detained person is unable to enlist assistance 
to appeal, then article 5(4) may be violated.310  This approach mirrors the Neary dictum 
that a person is ‘not only entitled but must be enabled’  to appeal.311  
 
G. Representation and Advocacy 
 
Under both the DoLS and the LPS the primary responsibility for ‘enabling’ rights of challenge 
fall on informal representatives – RPRs under the DoLS and ‘appropriate persons’ under 
the LPS. These will generally be friends or relatives of the person. Difficulties arise if they 
are unwilling, unable or unclear about obligations to enable rights of challenge. Friends 
and relatives may also find the court appeal process daunting or bewildering – an 
octogenarian RPR described it as ‘complex and harrowing’.312 Others, like Steven Neary’s 
father, may be scared of rocking the boat when reliant on the responsible body to provide 
care or treatment. In AJ the Court of Protection held that RPRs must be both willing and 
able to assist the person in exercising rights of challenge.313 Close relatives or friends who 
supported or helped set up the arrangements may therefore be inappropriate because of 
their clear conflict of interest in challenging them.314 This is likely to be a particular concern 
for privately arranged care for many older people. Responsible bodies are obliged to 
monitor the RPR and terminate their appointment if they fail to fulfil this representation 
role.315  
 
The provisions for representation and advocacy under both the DoLS and LPS are extremely 
complex and are depicted in Fig 2 (for DoLS) and Fig 3 (for LPS).  There are some important 
differences between the two schemes. The DoLS require that a person is represented by 
an RPR or an IMCA, or both, in all circumstances. The same cannot be said for the LPS: as 
Fig 3 shows, there are various circumstances where a detained person may have nobody 
representing them. The DoLS also guarantees to the detained person a freestanding 
unconditional right to request an IMCA, however under the LPS if the responsible body is 
satisfied there is an ‘appropriate person’ to represent the cared-for person, their right to 
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request an IMCA in effect transfers to the appropriate person.  Under the DoLS, the 
provisions for appointing an IMCA are based on situations where otherwise the person 
would be unrepresented316, or where an (unpaid) RPR and the detained person are likely 
to, or already have, failed to exercise rights of challenge when it would be ‘reasonable’ to 
do so.317  This means that under the DoLS if there is an indication that the person might 
wish to exercise rights of appeal and the RPR is not assisting them, the supervisory body 
must appoint an IMCA to assist them.  However, under the LPS, duties to appoint an IMCA 
are based on capacity and best interests determinations, 318  creating a clear risk of 
concluding that it is not in a person’s ‘best interests’ to be provided with advocacy support 
to exercise rights of challenge.  
 
Under the DoLS, supervisory bodies ‘must appoint’ an IMCA where the relevant duties are 
engaged,319 but under the LPS responsible bodies must only take ‘reasonable steps’ to do 
so.  There are therefore numerous situations under the LPS where best interests decisions, 
a failure to appoint an IMCA, or a failure to ensure representatives are both willing and 
able to challenge the detention potentially stand between a person being entitled to appeal 
and their being enabled to do so.   
 
The risk that a person will be unable to exercise rights of challenge under article 5(4) is, if 
anything, further increased under the LPS in comparison with the existing problems under 
the DoLS.
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Figure 2 Schematic depiction of provision for advocacy and representation under the DoLS 



















Figure 3 Schematic depiction of provisions for advocacy and representation under the LPS 




Given the sheer complexity and gaps in both schemes it may be preferable to place the 
primary duty to enable rights of challenge on responsible bodies, instead of their serving 
as a ‘fallback’ where representatives have failed to do so. However, this was not considered 
by the Law Commission, and although a provision to this effect was inserted into the Bill 
in the Lords320 it was removed by a later government amendment.  The government’s 
approach was that detained persons and their relatives were of course ‘entitled’ to appeal 
but that recourse to courts should be avoided.321 The question of whether a detained 
person would be enabled to appeal when they wished to do so was not addressed.  The 
Law Commission had envisioned an automatic opt-out advocacy scheme, meaning the 
majority of people would receive expert assistance and advice on rights of challenge.322 
However, the government was concerned about the ‘imposition’ of advocacy and felt 
‘support from family and friends may be more appropriate and beneficial’.323 Thus the 2019 
amendments reverted to more limited scheme of independent advocacy, prioritising the 
putative preferences of families over enabling rights of challenge.   
 
H. Rights to Information 
 
Rights of challenge can only operate effectively if people are informed of their rights.324  
Thus Article 5(2) contains a duty to inform a person promptly and ‘in a language which he 
understands’ of the reasons why they have been deprived of their liberty.325 Detaining 
authorities must take ‘reasonable steps’ to impart this information326 – and where the 
person would not be able to understand it should be communicated to others able to 
represent their interests.327   
 
The DoLS require the managing authority of the care home or hospital to inform the 
detained person about the authorisation and their rights,328 whilst the supervisory body 
must give copies of the authorisation documentation to those representing the detained 
person, and ‘every interested person consulted by the best interests assessor.’329  The Law 
Commission did not discuss rights to information in their consultation and they did not 
appear initially in the 2018 Bill. This was raised as a concern by stakeholders and peers in 
the Lords. Bizarrely, the Minister at one point suggested that people could make subject 
access requests for this information under the GDPR,330 implying a fundamental lack of 
understanding of the nature of this safeguard.  
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The Lords inserted an amendment containing rights to information into the Bill331, which 
was accepted in principle but redrafted by the government in the Commons. The LPS now 
contain a three-stage information duty. Responsible bodies must publish general 
information about the authorisation process and people’s rights under the LPS scheme, in 
formats that are ‘accessible to, and appropriate to the needs of, cared-for persons and 
appropriate persons’.332 Once arrangements ‘are proposed’, the responsible body ‘must as 
soon as practicable take such steps as are practicable to ensure that’ the cared-for person 
and any appropriate person understands the nature of the arrangements, the effect of 
authorisation, and core rights including reviews and challenge.333  After authorisation, 
copies of the authorisation record must be given to the cared-for person and any IMCA or 
appropriate person representing them.334 
 
In some respects, the LPS adopt a more sophisticated approach to rights to information 
than the DoLS, with potential for higher quality accessible general information than exists 
presently. However, unlike the DoLS, a person who is consulted during the LPS process is 
not entitled to a copy of the authorisation record unless they are the ‘appropriate person’.  
This means friends and family may struggle to access the authorisation record if not 
considered ‘appropriate’ to represent the person. 
 
I. Court or Tribunal  
 
Under the DoLS, an ‘appeal’ against detention is made through an application to the Court 
of Protection to review a DoLS authorisation under s21A MCA.  As outlined above, there 
are significant concerns that this process is not being initiated when it should be – with the 
appeal rate currently standing at around 1 per cent. The government anticipates the rate 
of appeal will fall to 0.5 per cent of authorisations under the LPS, on the questionable basis 
that AMCPs will act as mediators in disputes.335  
 
This fractional difference in estimated rates of appeal may seem trifling but holds the key 
to understanding the fundamental weakness in the scheme: the cost of challenges in the 
Court of Protection. In 2015 the median cost to a supervisory body of a s21A appeal was 
around £10,000, but could exceed £100,000 in complex cases, whilst the median cost of a 
legal aid certificate for either P or the RPR was £7,288 and the mean was £14,665.336 The 
sheer scale of the LPS, coupled with the very high cost of appeals, meant that depressing 
the estimated rate of appeal a mere 0.5 per cent shaved over £35m off the estimated cost 
of the entire scheme,337 a substantial proportion of the claimed £200m savings.  Increasing 
rates of appeal beyond the already concerningly low rates under the DoLS would have 
wiped out any savings for the entire LPS scheme. 
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The complex reasons for the high costs of Court of Protection litigation are beyond the 
scope of this paper but appear to have exerted a chilling effect on improving rights of 
challenge under the LPS.  The solution, of course, is to reform the Court of Protection itself 
– addressing other associated concerns including delay, accessibility and participation in 
the proceedings.338  Throughout the history of the MCA and the DoLS, the idea of a tribunal 
to adjudicate disputes has been debated, and well supported at consultation by those 
favouring an informal, accessible and efficient form of dispute resolution.339  
 
The Law Commission initially favoured a tribunal under the LPS,340 as did the majority of 
consultees, but this was opposed by Court of Protection stakeholders.341 However, in their 
final report the Commission noted difficulties separating out LPS appeals from wider health 
and welfare matters which remained within the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection.  This 
concern tacitly acknowledges the difficulties outlined above in separating out the 
‘arrangements’ authorised under the LPS from the underlying care and treatment decisions 
made under the MCA. Devolution of the mental health tribunals in Wales also presented 
difficulties.  The Commission called for a further review of the appropriate judicial body for 
LPS appeals.342 The JCHR also recommended the government consider a tribunal or reform 
of the Court of Protection.343 However, the promised review is still awaited344 and so the 
forum for appeal under the LPS remains the unreformed Court of Protection under a new 
provision – s21ZA.   
 
J. Reviewing the ‘Arrangements’ 
 
The troubled distinction between underlying care and treatment decisions made under the 
MCA, and the ‘arrangements’ to enable these, surfaces again in relation to court reviews. 
Challenges to decisions made under the main provisions of the MCA are rare,345 in part 
because of restrictions on financial eligibility for legal aid. Following Cheshire West, a 
number of challenges were brought under s21A. Many related to ancillary matters such as 
a person’s capacity to make decisions around sex or contact,346 and even serious medical 
treatment decisions such as the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from people 
with severe brain injuries. 347  In Director of Legal Aid Casework & Ors v Briggs348 the Court 
of Appeal ruled that this was an illegitimate use of legal aid for s21A challenges, but held 
that matters like ‘contact’ still fell within the ambit of DoLS appeals. It seems quite possible 
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the Legal Aid Agency may make further attempts to restrict the nature of challenges that 
can be brought under s21ZA, relying upon the ‘bright line’ distinction between care and 
treatment decisions and the arrangements emphasised in connection with the LPS. 
 
K. The Definition of Deprivation of Liberty  
 
Although it was hoped that Cheshire West would definitively answer the question ‘what is 
a deprivation of liberty?’, there continued to be pressure for a statutory definition. Some 
respondents to the Law Commission’s consultation hoped to reverse Cheshire West.349 The 
Law Commission, whilst sympathetic, concluded this was ‘misguided’ since it could create 
gaps between the LPS scheme and the interpretation of article 5 by the courts under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).350 
 
The JCHR was also troubled by the consequences of Cheshire West, and particularly 
concerned by the application of the ‘acid test’ in domestic settings.  Echoing its earlier call 
for a statutory definition the JCHR considered two possibilities.351 They concluded that a 
‘causative’ approach based R (Ferreira) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London,352 
which holds that if the person’s ‘underlying condition was the cause’ of their not being free 
to leave this does not engage article 5, could give rise to difficulties in interpretation and 
be viewed as discriminatory.353  The second approach, which found more favour, tackled 
an element of deprivation of liberty not considered by the Supreme Court in Cheshire West: 
whether a person has given a ‘valid consent’ to their confinement. 354  Basing its 
recommendation on a submission from Alex Ruck Keene355  (who worked at the Law 
Commission on the LPS proposals) the Committee proposed a broader approach to ‘valid 
consent’ than the MCA’s binary test of mental capacity.356 This, they suggested, was 
supported by the CRPD Committee’s rejection of the binaries of ‘mental incapacity’.357   
 
A draft amendment specified that for the purposes of determining whether a person is 
deprived of their liberty under the LPS, the cared-for person should be considered to have 
given a ‘valid consent’ if they are ‘capable of expressing their wishes and feelings (verbally 
or otherwise)’, they had expressed ‘their persistent contentment’ with the arrangements, 
there was ‘no coercion involved’ in their implementation, and this was confirmed in writing 
by two professionals (one independent of the person’s care).358 This CRPD-influenced 
proposal could have resolved some of the more jarring outcomes of Cheshire West, such 
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as the conclusion that Steven Neary is deprived of his liberty in his own home, where he 
actively wishes to live, whilst still providing procedural safeguards.359  It was tabled by Lord 
Woolf,360 but rejected by the government on the basis that it conflicted with the position 
under the ECHR and would create a ‘gap’ in protection under the LPS scheme.361 
 
Initially the Government accepted the Law Commission’s recommendation against a 
statutory definition of deprivation of liberty.362 However, under pressure from stakeholders 
and the JCHR the government published its own statutory definition of deprivation of liberty 
only days before the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons.363 That definition 
was resoundingly criticised by stakeholders. 364  It would have excluded arrangements 
where a person’s ability to come and go from the place of their confinement was only 
temporary and potentially subject to permission seeking requirements, in direct 
contradiction of ECHR case law.365 It created latitude to escape scrutiny under the LPS by 
asserting that ‘if the person expressed a wish to leave the person would be enabled to do 
so’ – an approach that was rejected by the courts in both Bournewood and Cheshire 
West.366  The government’s statutory definition was rejected in the Lords and replaced with 
an alternative definition,367 which was subsequently rejected by the House of Commons.  
 
The final position agreed by both houses is that the 2019 amendments do not define 
deprivation of liberty, however guidance on those arrangements falling within scope of the 
LPS must be given in the Code of Practice, which must be reviewed within three years of 
coming into force and every five years thereafter.368  This approach, whilst no doubt 
unsatisfactory to those hoping to reverse Cheshire West, at least has the merit of not 
creating a constitutional nightmare for any court faced with conflicting interpretations of 
deprivation of liberty from the ECtHR, the Supreme Court and Parliament. The Code has 
more space for detail and nuance, and can be revised as case law develops. Nor does this 
approach preclude a legal challenge on what constitutes a ‘valid consent’ under the LPS, 
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The Government’s aim in the 2019 amendments to the MCA was to ‘reform a broken and 
bureaucratic DoLS system’, 369  provide ‘proportionate’ safeguards, increase flexibility, 
reduce complexity, and save £200m.  The final Act is a different beast from the heavily 
criticised Bill introduced in July 2018, but it also differs from the Law Commission’s 
proposals, which rested on improvements to the operation of the MCA, and much wider 
access to independent advocacy.  Have the 2019 amendments achieved the government’s 
aims, or should we agree with Baroness Murphy’s assessment that Parliament has failed in 
its task?370 
 
For those hoping to reverse Cheshire West, or concerned that the LPS will now pursue 
people ‘in their own homes’371, the 2019 amendments will disappoint. The LPS will provide 
safeguards that are currently entirely absent for people in settings such as supported living, 
and potentially improve access to justice through expanding the number of people eligible 
for legal aid via s21ZA challenges. Yet people in care homes and hospitals will lose layers 
of protection that the DoLS deliver in theory (although often not in reality).  The scheme 
is highly vulnerable to human rights challenges, particularly around its provisions for 
representation, renewals and appeals, unless creatively patched up by the Code and the 
courts, as the DoLS themselves were. 
 
The LPS attempt to secure article 5 compliance on an unprecedented scale by giving 
responsible bodies considerable discretion in how they deliver the safeguards. This 
flexibility introduces both complexity and risk.  Some responsible bodies will no doubt use 
the LPS as they have the DoLS – to scrutinise and address restrictive practices and resolve 
disputes.  Others will be less vigilant, and the next generation of Neary type litigation will 
consider how responsible bodies exercise their considerable discretion over assessments, 
determinations, renewals, reviews and fundamental safeguards including representation, 
advocacy and appeals.  The risk remains that some people who are deprived of their liberty 
will not receive any safeguards at all. Even following Cheshire West there is considerable 
variability in the age standardised rates of DoLS applications across supervisory bodies, 
raising the possibility that some supervisory bodies are more proactive than others in 
securing article 5 safeguards.372 
 
The LPS foreground the wishes and feelings of the person in a way that the DoLS often 
failed to do. ‘Objections’ is the weight bearing concept for the crucial safeguard of AMCP 
review. Courts and practitioners will have to grapple with the complexities of working out 
what a person wants, and what it means to ‘object’, when one’s methods of communication 
are (at least to others) unclear or disputed, or even suppressed by one’s circumstances. 
This is not the ‘will and preferences’ paradigm exhorted in connection with the CRPD, but 
it is a step in that direction. 
 
At the heart of the DoLS and the LPS lurks an anxiety, about the kinds of power that are 
exercised within caregiving relationships, particularly where the care recipient is unlikely to 
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be able to alert others to problems.  It is doubtful that article 5 is the best mechanism for 
addressing this in some of the circumstances where the LPS will now apply.373 But there 
were few other available vehicles for securing independent scrutiny and challenge under 
the MCA, and no sign of a government seeking to remedy this. Bournewood and Cheshire 
West held a gun to the government’s head,374 and the LPS was the reply. 
 
We are left with our unanswered question: what are these safeguards for?  Are they, as 
Baroness Murphy suggests, addressing ‘a problem we did not know we had’, instigated by 
the judiciary375?  The circular answer of article 5 compliance does not help us. We might 
ask what article 5 is protecting Steven Neary from today, living happily in his own home? 
Telling thousands of families that they are detaining their relatives feels like political 
dynamite at a time when human rights are increasingly vulnerable.376 Yet there are very 
real concerns about coercion and restrictive practices in a broad range of care settings, 
with limited alternative scrutiny, and few realistic avenues for disabled people and families 
to challenge decisions made under the MCA.  Whether the LPS will assist in addressing the 





This article was written in 2019, when we inhabited another world, before the coronavirus 
pandemic of 2020 and the UK lockdown.  Although the UK government has introduced 
‘easements’ to the MHA in response to the coronavirus Act, it has not done so for the MCA 
or the DoLS. Expectations that people in care homes will be ‘isolated’ in their rooms, and 
the imposition of ‘lockdown’ measures raise specific issues for the MCA and the DoLS that 
have not as yet been addressed.377 The likelihood is that many more people are now 
effectively deprived of their liberty in care homes and other care settings – often unlawfully 
– in response to the pandemic.  It is also likely that work on the new Codes of Practice and 
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